



Can we do science without numbers? Quine (1961) says no. Numbers and other
mathematical entities are indispensible. Field (1980) says yes. Numbers may be useful,
but are not essential. With enough time and patience, we can do science without them.
Now consider a seemingly unrelated question: How much contingency is there?
Spinoza says none. Whatever is true is necessary. Williamson (2013) says none with
respect to what exists, but some with respect to how things are. The ordinary view,
perhaps, is that there is some with respect to what exists, and some with respect to how
things are.
These seemingly unrelated questions—one in the philosophy of math and science
and the other in metaphysics—share an unexpectedly close connection. For as it turns
out, a radical answer to the second leads to a breakthrough on the first.
The radical answer is immutabilism, a view endorsed by Leibniz. Immutabilism
says that there is some contingency with respect to what exists, but none with respect
to how things are. Immutabilism is thus a sort of converse of necessitism, which is the
view endorsed byWilliamson.
The breakthrough is a new strategy for doing science without numbers. Field
shows how to do science without numbers in classical mechanics. His strategy, though,
requires the existence of spacetime points. This is fine, so far it goes. But there are
reasons you might want an alternative: You might be a relationalist, and so reject
the existence of spacetime points. You might be concerned that the strategy will not
generalize, especially to theories formulated in terms of state space. Or youmight simply
wonder whether we can get by with less. I think that we can, and immutabilism is the
way to do it.
1 Nominalism
We can distinguish two views about scientific theories. Scientific nominalism is the
view that the best scientific theories include a nominalist theory. A theory is nominalist
1
when it only quantifies over concrete particulars.1 Concrete particulars include things
like particles.
Scientific Platonism, on the other hand, is the view that all of the best scientific
theories are Platonist. A theory is Platonist when it is not nominalist. Thus, a Platonist
theory will quantify over things like numbers or universals in addition to things like
particles.2
Why might you be a scientific nominalist? Suppose that you are ametaphysical
nominalist. You say that the only things that exists, fundamentally speaking, are
concrete particulars. Suppose that you are also a scientific fundamentalist. You
thus claim that fundamental reality is best described by at least one of the best scientific
theories. In that case, scientific nominalism will follow.
Metaphysical nominalism, then, is one road to scientific nominalism. But there
are also many others. For example, you might think that numbers exist, and that their
existence is fundamental. Still, you might think that their role in science is merely
representational. But if the role of numbers is merely representational, then we should
be able to do science without them, given enough time and patience.3
Similarly, youmight think that nominalist theories have certain virtues thatPlatonist
theories lack. For example the most direct objects of scientific inquiry are concrete
particulars—things like meter sticks and scales and particle accelerators. Nominalist
theories are thus intrinsic in a way that Platonist theories are not. For nominalist
theories explain the behavior of concrete particulars without appealing to anything
other than concrete particulars. As such, you might think that nominalist theories
1. This is only a rough characterization. What it means for a theory to be nominalist depends on the
background ideology. For example, suppose that we have a fundamental physical theory stated in terms of
a feature-placing language of the sort suggested by Quine (1971). In that case, the theory quantifies over
nothing, so thereby quantifies over nothing more than particle. But theories given in terms of a feature-
placing language could fail to be nominalist. It might, for example, place mathematical features (like being
an integer) alongside physical features (like having mass). Thus, I prefer to adopt a “we know them when
we see them” approach towards identifying nominalist theories.
2. The views described here are weak scientific nominalism and strong scientific Platonism. Alter-
natively, you could be a strong scientific nominalist who thinks that all of the best physical theories are
nominalist. You could also be a weak scientific Platonist who merely holds that some of the best physical
theories are Platonist. Since it could be that some of the best theories are nominalist and some of the best
theories are Platonist, the conjunction of weak nominalism and weak Platonism is consistent.
3. The distinction we are drawing here between metaphysical nominalism and scientific nominalism
is similar to a distinction drawn by Field (1984). What we are calling scientific nominalism is roughly the
disjunction of what he calls nominalism and lightweight Platonism. I say roughly, because a scientific
nominalist might also reject substantial metaphysical questions altogether. But in that case, she might be
a scientific nominalist while rejecting both nominalism (in Field’s sense) and lightweight Platonism, since
these are both substantial metaphysical views.
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are both more satisfying and more illuminating.4 This in turn suggests that the best
scientific theories may include nominalist theories, since they have a unique profile
when it comes to theoretical virtues.5
You can be a scientific nominalist, then, without being a metaphysical nominalist.
The converse is also true: You can be a metaphysical nominalist without being a
scientific nominalist.
For example, suppose that you are a logical atomist.6 You say that the only
fundamental facts are atomic facts about concrete material particulars. The best
scientific theories, though, have strong and simple laws. Thus, the best scientific theories
involve generality, which you take to be non-fundamental. Scientific fundamentalism
is therefore false. But in that case, it may be that the best scientific theories are Platonist
theories, despite the fact that the only things that exist, fundamentally speaking, are
particles.7 So you might be a scientific Platonist while also being a metaphysical
nominalist.
For my own part, I am both a scientific nominalist and a metaphysical nominalist,
though my commitment to the first is stronger than my commitment to the second.
Our focus in this paper will be scientific nominalism. What we want to know is:
Can we build scientific theories while quantifying over nothing more than concrete
particles? Canwe do sciencewithout numbers? Thus, by nominalism, wewill generally
mean scientific nominalism. Likewise, by Platonism, we will generally mean scientific
Platonism. Questions about metaphysical nominalism and metaphysical Platonism are
also important, but will remain in the background, for the most part.
1.1 Quantities
The physical world is built using physical quantities like mass, charge, and distance. To
fix on an example, suppose we perform a series of experiments and discover that the
movement of particles is fully described by Newton’s laws. These laws require there
to be distance ratios between particles.8 Thus, in order to state the laws, we need a
4. For example, synthetic geometries, like those proposed by Tarski (1952), would seem to be both
more satisfying and more illuminating than the corresponding analytic geometries.
5. That one might prefer nominalist theories because they are more intrinsic is also a nice point
originally made by Field (1984).
6. Following in the tradition of Russell (1918) andWittgenstein (1922).
7. If there is no fundamental quantification, then howarewe to characterizemetaphysical nominalism?
My preferred solution is to use a non-fundamental language with a fundamentality operator. Assuming
that non-fundamental things are not fundamentally self-identical, we can then construe metaphysical
nominalism as the claim that ∀𝑥(Fund(𝑥 = 𝑥) ⊃ Concrete(𝑥)).
8. Here is a simple case: Suppose the world is Newtonian with gravity the only force. There are three
particles 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐 with 𝑏 between 𝑎 and 𝑐. The particles are at rest relative to one another and 𝑎 is as
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language that can describe distance ratios.
What are distance ratios? Suppose we use a meter stick to determine that 𝑎 and 𝑏
are two meters apart and 𝑐 and 𝑑 are one meter apart. Thus, 𝑎 and 𝑏 are twice as far
apart as 𝑐 and 𝑑. This is a distance ratio. Others include being three times as far apart,
being half as far apart, and so on.
A Platonist can easily describe distance ratios in her fundamental theory. She
could, for example, describe them using a distance ratio function from particles to
real numbers. Thus, to express the idea that 𝑎 and 𝑏 are twice as far apart as 𝑐 and 𝑑, she
could write:
𝛿(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑) = 2 (1)
If you like, you might think of this as a definite description:
The distance ratio of 𝑎 and 𝑏 to 𝑐 and 𝑑 = 2.
Such descriptions let the Platonist describe particle configurations, apply the dynamical
laws, and predict how things move.
Suppose, though, that we are scientific nominalists. We are thus committed to
theorizing about the physical world without using things like distance functions. In
that case, how are we going to express facts involving distance ratios? This problem,
as applied to physical quantities in general, is what Field (1984) calls the problem of
quantities.
One strategy for solving the problem is simple nominalism. In the case of distance
ratios, simple nominalism requires nothing more than particles and a pair of relations.
Those relations are congruence and betweenness.
Cong(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑) 𝑎 and 𝑏 are the same distance apart as 𝑐 and 𝑑
Bet(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) 𝑏 is on a straight line between 𝑎 and 𝑐
In each case, the gloss on the right is merely intuitive. The congruence relation
is naturally described by quantifying over distances and the between relations by
quantifying over lines. But these are both just basic relations. Thus, they come with
no commitment to the existence of things like distances or lines. There are no strings
attached.
To see how a simple nominalismmight account for distance ratios, consider a world
massive as 𝑏 and 𝑐 put together. In that case, by the law of universal gravitation, the collision of 𝑎 and 𝑏
will be simultaneous with the collision of 𝑏 and 𝑐 just in case the distance ratio of 𝑎 and 𝑏 to 𝑏 and 𝑐 is√
2. But if there is no determinate distance ratio, the laws will fail to determine whether the collisions will
be simultaneous. We thus get an unwanted failure of determinism.
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in which there are exactly four point particles that are arranged as follows:
a x b c
The betweenness and congruence relations are as illustrated, with the particles 𝑎 and 𝑏
twice as far apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐. This distance ratio is the one that we want to explain.
The strategy, in this case, is straightforward. The simple nominalist says that 𝑎 and
𝑏 are twice as far apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐, in the sense that there is an 𝑥 between 𝑎 and 𝑏, such
that 𝑎 and 𝑐 are congruent with 𝑥 and 𝑏, and 𝑥 and 𝑏 are congruent with 𝑏 and 𝑐.
More generally, we can define the notion of an equally spaced line of particles using
betweenness and congruence.9 This gives us a defined polyadic predicate.
Line(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛 form an equally spaced line
We then express the claim that 𝑎 and 𝑏 are twice as far apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐 using:
∃𝑥 Line(𝑎, 𝑥, 𝑏, 𝑐) (2)
Looking at the previous diagram, you can see why this is adequate, at an intuitive level.
Since we have an equally spaced line, the distance between each pair can be thought of
as a unit. There are two units between 𝑎 and 𝑏, but there is only one unit between 𝑏
and 𝑐. So 𝑎 and 𝑏 are twice as far apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐.
The problem is that simple nominalism only works if there happens to be enough
particles and they happen to be in the right place. For example, consider a world just
like the last, except that the second particle from the left has been deleted.
a b c
This is a world in which 𝑎 and 𝑏 are twice as far apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐. There is, however, no
way to explain this distance ratio using betweenness and congruence relations. After
all, consider a world in which 𝑎 and 𝑏 are half as far apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐 instead.
a b c
These worlds have exactly the same betweenness and congruence relations, but different
9. Particles 𝑎 and 𝑏 are colocated when there is some 𝑥 such that Cong(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑥, 𝑥). The particles
𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛 form a line when no two of them are colocated and 𝑎𝑘 is between 𝑎𝑗 and 𝑎ℎ whenever
𝑗 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ ℎ. The line is equally spaced if 𝑎𝑗 and 𝑎𝑗+1 are congruent with 𝑎𝑘 and 𝑎𝑘+1 for all 𝑗 and 𝑘
such that 0 ≤ 𝑗 < 𝑛 and 0 ≤ 𝑘 < 𝑛.
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distance ratios. Thus, the distance ratios cannot be explained by the betweenness and
congruence relations. Such worlds are sparse.
Field’s solution is to accept the existence of spacetime points. Spacetime points, like
particles, can stand in betweenness and congruence relations. Unlike particles, though,
spacetime points are always numerous and well-organized. You can always count on
them being exactly where they need to be.
For example, suppose that we have laws guaranteeing that whenever there are two
things, there is a spacetime point halfway between them. This means that in particular,
there will be a spacetime point 𝑥 halfway between 𝑎 and 𝑏 in the first of our two sparse
worlds.
a x b c
But now, since there is once again something halfway between 𝑎 and 𝑏, we can explain
the distance ratio in basically the same way as before. That is, 𝑎 and 𝑏 are twice as far
apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐 because:
∃𝑥 Line(𝑎, 𝑥, 𝑏, 𝑐) (3)
The only difference is that now, 𝑥 is a spacetime point instead of a particle. But the
basic structure of the explanation is exactly the same.10
There is much to be said for the substantivalist strategy. Spacetime points are
concrete particulars, and so accepting their existence is consistent with nominalism.
Fields are also naturally thought of as properties of spacetime points, and so there is
some reason to think that we will need spacetime points anyway to account for fields.
In that case, using spacetime points to explain distance ratios is no further cost.
On the other hand, there are also reasons to be wary. After all, spacetime faces its
own slate of challenges, ranging from shift arguments to hole arguments.11 There is
also the concern that the strategy will not generalize. Some of our best science describes
quantities using things like state space. But while it is reasonably clear that a nominalist
can accept the points of ordinary spacetime as concrete particulars, it is far from clear
that a nominalist can accept the points of state space as concrete particulars. But in that
case, how is a nominalist going to nominalize state space theories? We will return to
this issue in §5.
Another strategy for expressing distance ratios is to accept distances rather than
10. Early axiomatizations of Euclidean space using congruence and betweenness include those from
Veblen (1904) and Pieri (1908). The project was later advanced by Alfred Tarski and his students, who
gave increasingly simple axioms in (Tarski 1952), (Tarski 1959), and (Gupta 1965).
11. See for example Dasgupta (2016) and […]
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spacetime points. What are distances? Brent Mundy (1987) suggests a view on
which distances are binary relations between particles. Particles thus have distances by
instantiating them. Axioms governing distance relations are then given using second-
order quantification into predicate position and a pair of second-order predicates.
𝑋 ≥ 𝑌 𝑋 is at least as great as 𝑌
Sum(𝑋, 𝑌 , 𝑍) 𝑋 and 𝑌 sum to 𝑍
With appropriate axioms in place, we can then explain distance ratios, even in sparse
worlds. For example, here is our three-particle world again.
a b c
𝑅 𝑆
The particles that 𝑎 and 𝑏 are then twice as far apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐 because 𝑎 and 𝑏 have the
distance 𝑅 and 𝑏 and 𝑐 have the distance 𝑆. Moreover, 𝑆 and 𝑆 sums to 𝑅. Thus, the
distance ratio can be expressed with:
𝑅(𝑎, 𝑏) ∧ 𝑆(𝑏, 𝑐) ∧ Sum(𝑆, 𝑆, 𝑅) (4)
This solution, though, is not available to nominalists, since it requires higher-order
quantification over relations.12 But scientific nominalism is precisely the view that we
can give scientific theories without quantifying over such things.
Mundy can explain distance ratios in sparse worlds because he is a Platonist. Thus,
even if the particles are sparse, his distance relations are plentiful.13 Like spacetime
points, distance relations are numerous and well-organized. You can always count on
them being where they need to be.
On the other hand, if there are distance relations, but they are not plentiful, wemay
once again find ourselves unable to express the needed distance ratios. For example,
suppose you are an Aristotelian. You thus deny that distance relations exist when not
instantiated. Now consider the following sparse world. There are exactly three particles.
12. A view that youmight call easygoing nominalism accepts higher-order quantification over universals,
while rejecting first-order quantification over universals. In contrast, serious nominalism rejects all quan-
tification over universals whatsoever. There is an ongoing dispute about whether easygoing nominalism is
compatible with the best reasons for being a nominalist. Arthur Prior Prior (1971) says yes. I am inclined
to say no. For present purposes, we can just stipulate that our interest is in the question of whether we can
do science as serious nominalists.
13. In particular, Mundy’s axioms guarantee the distance relations form an ordered semigroup.
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This time, the particles 𝑎 and 𝑏 are three times as far apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐.
a b c
𝑅 𝑆
Mundy will say that the distance ratio is explained by the fact that 𝑎 and 𝑏 stand in
distance relation𝑅 and 𝑏 and 𝑐 stand in distance relation𝑆. Moreover, there is a distance
relation 𝑋 such that 𝑆 and 𝑆 sum to 𝑋, and 𝑆 and 𝑋 sum to 𝑅.
∃𝑋(𝑅(𝑎, 𝑏) ∧ 𝑆(𝑏, 𝑐) ∧ Sum(𝑆, 𝑆, 𝑋) ∧ Sum(𝑆, 𝑋, 𝑅)) (5)
This requires the existence of a distance relation 𝑋 that is the sum of 𝑆 and 𝑆. But if
the only distance relations that exist are the ones that are instantiated, there is no such
𝑋. Thus, the Aristotelian will find herself unable to explain the relevant distance ratio.
1.2 Uniqueness
We can give a theory of distance ratios without numbers, then, if we quantify over
spacetime points or distance relations. You might wonder, though, whether these are
the only options.
A natural thought, at this point, is that perhaps we could give a modal theory of
distance ratios. For example, youmight think that 𝑎 and 𝑏 are twice as far apart as 𝑏 and
𝑐 in a sparse world, not because there is actually a particle 𝑥 halfway between 𝑎 and 𝑏,
but because there could have been.
As compelling as the basic idea might be, modal strategies face a serious challenge,
which we will call the problem of uniqueness. For suppose that the actual world 𝑤1
is as illustrated below. The particles 𝑎 and 𝑏 are twice as far apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐, and so
this is the distance ratio we need to explain. The modal proposal, then, is that this is so
a
a





because there is a possible world 𝑤2 in which the three particles are exactly the same,
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but in which there is an additional particle 𝑥 standing in the appropriate betweenness
and congruence relations.
So far so good. The question is: What does it mean for 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐 to be exactly the
same in worlds 𝑤1 and 𝑤2?
We could say that particles are exactly the same when they are intrinsically the same.
Thus, the three particles in𝑤1 are exactly the same in𝑤2 because they stand in the same
betweenness and congruence relations in 𝑤2 that they do in 𝑤1.14
But now observe: World 𝑤3 is possible. Moreover, the particles in 𝑤1 stand in the
same betweenness and congruence relation in 𝑤3 that they do in 𝑤1. Thus, they are
intrinsically the same and so, on the present proposal, exactly the same.
The problem is that 𝑎 and 𝑏 are three times as far apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐 in 𝑤3. So if the
possibility of 𝑤2 is enough to make 𝑎 and 𝑏 twice as far apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐 in 𝑤1, then
by parallel reasoning, the possibility of 𝑤3 is enough to make 𝑎 and 𝑏 three times as far
apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐 in 𝑤1. But in that case, the very same particles in the very same world
are both twice as far apart and three times as far apart. This is absurd. So the proposal
fails.
For the modal strategy to work, there has to be a relevant difference between world
𝑤2 and world 𝑤3. But if we only have congruence and betweenness relations within
worlds, there is no relevant difference. This because the three particles from world 𝑤1
stand in exactly the same betweenness and congruence within each world.
This leads to a natural suggestion. Maybe the worlds can be distinguished if we
allow for relations not only withinworlds, but across worlds.
Looking back at the above diagram, suppose that the congruence relations across
worlds are as they appear. Thus, 𝑎 and 𝑏 at 𝑤1 are congruent with 𝑎 and 𝑏 at 𝑤2, but
not congruent with 𝑎 and 𝑏 at𝑤3. In that case, we do have a relevant difference between
𝑤2 and 𝑤3. Thus, comparisons of congruence across worlds give us a natural strategy
for solving the problem.
The question is: Can a nominalist express such comparisons across worlds? This
will be our focus in the next section.
1.3 Cross-modal Comparisons
Comparisons across worlds are are ordinary and familiar. We might say that Socrates
could have been taller than he is, or that the Athenians could have been happier than
14. Say that two particles 𝑎 and 𝑏 are colocated when Bet(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑎). The only non-trivial facts about
betweenness and congruence in𝑤1 are that none of the three particles are colocated and that 𝑏 is between
𝑎 and 𝑐. Thus, all it takes for 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐 to be intrinsically the same in 𝑤2 as they are in 𝑤1 is for none
of them to be colocated and for 𝑏 to be between 𝑎 and 𝑐.
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they are. In the first case, we are saying that there is a possible world in which Socrates
is taller than he is in the actual world. And in the second, we are saying that there is a
possible world in which the Athenians are happier than they are in the actual world.
Such comparisons are cross-modal comparisons.
There are a variety of approaches to the metaphysics of modality. For our purposes,
we can focus on two, whichwill be used to illustrate the general challenges in expressing
cross-modal comparisons as a nominalist.
Modal realism is the view that the most basic modal facts should be understood
in terms of quantification over a pluriverse of island universes. These island universes
are spatiotemporally disconnected from our own, but no less real or concrete.
Modalism is the view that modal facts are basic, and so should be understood in
terms of modal operators. The modalist, unlike the modal realist, is at best agnostic
about whether there are any other island universes.
The modal realist and the modalist, then, have very different views. They also have
different languages: The modal realist has a language with quantifiers ranging over the
pluriverse. The modalist has a language with modal operators.
Now consider how each might express cross-modal comparisons. Suppose that we
want to explain the fact that:
Socrates could have been taller than he actually is. (6)
A modal realist can do this using nothing more than a pair of relations.
∃𝑥(Ctp(𝑥, 𝑠) ∧ Taller(𝑥, 𝑠)) (7)
Thus, according to the modal realist, Socrates could have been taller than he actually
is because there is a counterpart of Socrates, somewhere in the pluriverse, who is taller
than Socrates.
The question is whether the modalist can do the same. She might try saying that
Socrates could have been taller than he actually is by writing:
3(Taller(𝑠, 𝑠)) (8)
But this says that it could have been that Socrates was taller than himself, not that
it could have been that Socrates was taller than he actually is. She could try adding
something like an actuality operator to her language. This would let her say:
3@(Taller(𝑠, 𝑠)) (9)
But this is equivalent to saying that Socrates is actually taller than himself, which is also
not what we wanted. These exhaust the most obvious syntactic possibilities. So the
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modalist has no clear strategy for expressing cross-modal comparisons. Call this the
problem of cross-modal comparisons.
The standard solution is to use quantification over universals. In the case of height
comparisons, this means quantifying over height properties. On this approach, a
modalist will express (6) with:
∃𝑋(𝑋(𝑠) ∧ 3(∃𝑌 (𝑌 (𝑠) ∧ 𝑌 > 𝑋))) (10)
This says that there is a height that Socrates has, and it could have been that there was a
height that Socrates had that was greater.15
Now return to the question of nominalism. The nominalist would like to give a
theory of distance ratios by using cross-modal comparisons. She could try to do this
as a modalist. But the standard solution for expressing cross-modal comparisons with
modal operators is to use quantification over universals, which is not available to the
nominalist.16
Could a nominalist be a modal realist? I think this question deserves some care.
Suppose you are a nominalist and one day, you visit the oracle. She has a long track
record of answering questions truthfully, so you ask her whether there is a pluriverse.
She says yes. Moreover, she tells you that the pluriverse is built entirely out of concrete
particulars. There are no numbers, universals, or any other such things.
Should you give up your nominalism? The answer, it seems to me, is clearly not.
How could learning that there aremore concrete particulars be inconsistent with the
view that everything is a concrete particular? Giving up nominalism, on the grounds
that there are many concrete universes, would be like giving up theism, on the grounds
that there are many gods.
Nominalism and modal realism, then, are broadly consistent. The question is
whether there is any coherent grounds for being both a nominalist and a modal realist,
given our actual evidence. I say no. For as Lewis points out, insofar as we have reasons
to accept the pluriverse, those reasons are similar to the ones we have for accepting
numbers.17 That is, in both cases, the reasons for accepting either the existence of the
pluriverse or the existence of numbers are broadly a priori. But the nominalist denies
that we can accept the existence of numbers on broadly a priori grounds. So she must
15. Variations of the standard solution have been endorsed byMorton (1984), Cresswell (1990), Milne
(1992), and Kemp (2000).
16. This is another point at which easygoing nominalism is relevant. For if the nominalist can be an
easygoing nominalist, then she canuse the standard solution. Whether easygoingnominalism is compatible
with the bestmotivations for nominalism is an interesting question. As in footnote 12, we can just stipulate
that our interest here is in solutions that do not use higher-order quantification over universals.
17. See (Lewis 2001, Chapter 1).
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also do the same for the pluriverse.
2 Compossible Immutabilism
We saw in §1 that, in order to do science without numbers, the nominalist needs to give
a theory of quantities. One natural strategy is to use modality. But to use modality, she
needs some way of ensuring that distance ratios are unique. This can be done if the
nominalist can use cross-modal comparisons. The problem, though, is that there is no
clear strategy for making cross-modal comparisons as a nominalist.
In this section, we are going to describe a new view about modality called compos-
sible immutabilism. This new view will let nominalists make cross-modal comparisons
which, in turn, will give them a new strategy for doing science without numbers.
2.1 The View
We ordinarily think that things are mutable, in the sense that they could have had
different properties and could have stood in different relations. For example: My coffee
mug is blue and sitting onmy desk. But while thatmay be, it could have been a different
color. It could have been green instead of blue. It also could have had a different location.
Instead of being on my desk, it could have been in the kitchen. Thus, my coffee mug
would seem to be mutable.
Things that are not mutable are immutable. Whether there are any immutable
things is a matter of controversy, so there are no uncontroversial examples. Maybe God
is immutable. Maybe numbers are.
Immutabalism is the view that necessarily, everything is immutable. Thus, while
there may be contingency with respect to what exists, there is no contingency with
respect to how things are. When things have properties and stand in relations, they
have those properties and stand in those relations necessarily. The opposing view is
mutabilism, which says that possibly, something is mutable.
Immutabilism has some precedence in the history of philosophy. Spinoza is an
immutabilist in virtue of being a necessitarian. That is, because he holds that whatever
is true is also necessary, it follows that necessarily, everything is immutable.
Leibniz is also an immutabilist, but of a less trivial variety. Unlike Spinoza, he
accepts that there is contingency with respect to what exist. Still, he denies is that there
is contingency with respect to how things are.
What we are going to call Leibnizian immutabilism is the view that necessarily,
everything is worldbound. An individual is worldbound when necessarily, had things
been any different, that individual would not have existed. Thus, according to the
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Leibnizian, nothing exists at more than one possible world.18
Compossible immutabilism is a formof immutabilism. But unlike the Leibnizian
immutabilist,the compossible immutabilist denies that things exist at only one possible
world. In fact, quite the opposite: For the compossible immutabilist maintains that
whenever there are two possible worlds, those worlds can be composed to form a third
possible world, where everything from the first two worlds exists together. Thus, she
endorses what you might think of as a paste-together theory of modality.
So for example, suppose that we have two possible worlds 𝑤1 and 𝑤2 below. Each






worlds, they can be composed to form a third world, in which everything from the first
two possible worlds exists together. Thus, in this case, we have a third world 𝑤3 that
contains both of the universes 𝑢1 and 𝑢2.
What we are going to do now ismake all of this more precise. Thus, we will describe
the language of immutabilism in §2.2. We will then say more about various principles
that the compossible immutabilist might accept in §2.3.
2.2 Language
We are going to think of the immutabilist as having a fundamental language ℒ𝐼. This
language is a first-order plural language. It thus includes:
Singular variables 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, …
Plural variables 𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧, …
Singular quantifiers ∃𝑥 and ∀𝑥
Plural quantifiers ∃𝑥𝑥 and ∀𝑥𝑥
Truth-functional operators ∧, ∨, ⊃, ¬
Modal operators2,3
18. Whether Leibniz himself accepted that necessarily. everything is worldbound is controversial. The
standard view, though, is that he did. For more on these interpretive questions, see Mates (1989), Adams
(1994), and Cover and Hawthorne (1990, 1999).
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Singular variables range over individuals. Plural variables range over pluralities.
What are pluralities? A plurality is not a thing, like a particle or a spacetime point.
A plurality is simply things taken together.
To borrow an example from George Boolos (1984), suppose you have a bowl of
Cheerios. You consider each individually: Here is one Cheerio. There is another.
Besides each individual Cheerio, though, you might also consider the Cheerios, taken
together. For the Cheerios have properties that are not had by any Cheerio. The
Cheerios fill the bowl, but no Cheerio fills the bowl. The Cheerios weigh 50 grams,
but no Cheerioweighs 50 grams.
You might then wonder, what are the Cheerios? Maybe the Cheerios are a set.
Maybe the Cheerios are a fusion.
Maybe. But many of us think that Cheerios taken together are thin in a way that
sets or fusions are not. After all, if you accept that there is a set of Cheerios, then you
are committed to sets. And if you accept that there is a fusion of Cheerios, then you are
committed to fusions. But if you accept that there are Cheerios taken together, you are
committed to nothing more than each Cheerio, taken one by one. The Cheerios taken
together are what we are calling a plurality.
This point is worth belaboring because, in the present context, we want to build a
version of immutabilism that is consistent with nominalism. Thus, it is important that
pluralities are not abstract things, like sets.
Predicates in the immutabilist language are sorted. This means that each argument
place can take either terms for individuals or terms for pluralities, but not both.19
Predicates are allowed to have any finite arity. The logical predicates are:
𝑥 =𝑠 𝑦 𝑥 is identical 𝑦
𝑥𝑥 =𝑝 𝑦𝑦 the 𝑥𝑥 are identical to the 𝑦𝑦
𝑥 ≺ 𝑦𝑦 𝑥 is among the 𝑦𝑦
𝑥 ∼ 𝑦 𝑥 is connected to 𝑦
The first is a singular identity predicate. The second is a plural identity predicate. We
can thus identify individuals with individuals and pluralities with pluralities.20 But we
cannot identify individuals with pluralities or pluralities with individuals. The third
logical predicate is the among predicate. This lets us say which individuals are among
with pluralities. The fourth is a connectedness predicate. Two things are connected,
19. In other words, there are no complex sorts, including disjunctive sorts. If there were disjunctive
sorts, then there could be argument places that could take either singular or plural terms. For my own part,
I can see no use for disjunctive sorts, but would not be opposed to adding them.
20. Context will generally determine which identity predicate we have in mind. Thus, in most cases, we
will drop the singular and plural subscripts.
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intuitively speaking, when they are in the same universe.
Once the immutabilist has a language, there is the question of what logic she should
accept. There are many systems that could be built. What we are going to do is build
a system calledCI. This system is the one that I accept. It includes the core principles
of compossible immutabilism, along with others that help to fill out the view. While
building this system, though, there will be various choice points. So we will also discuss
other ways in which a compossible immutabilist systemmight be constructed.21
The background logic for CI includes a free logic, along with the propositional
modal logic S5. The free logic ensures individuals and pluralities can both exist
contingently. Names canonly be assigned to individual andpluralities that actually exist.
There are also axioms guaranteeing that pluralities are rigid and that connectedness is
an equivalence relation.
Our background logic is a plural logic, and so there is the question of which things
formpluralities. Compossible immutabilism as such is compatiblewith awide variety of
answers. The systemCI that we are constructing, though, will include all the instances
of Plural Comprehension.22
Plural Comprehension ∃𝑥𝑥∀𝑦(𝑦 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ≡ 𝜙(𝑦))
This says that for any condition, there is a plurality consisting of all and only the things
that satisfy that condition. Plural Comprehension also entails two further principles,
which we will call Everything and Nothing.
Everything ∃𝑥𝑥∀𝑦(𝑦 ≺ 𝑥𝑥)
Nothing ∃𝑥𝑥∀𝑦(𝑦⊀𝑥𝑥)
Everything says that there are things such that everything is one of them. Nothing says
that there are things such that nothing is among them. Thus, Nothing guarantees the
existence of an empty plurality.
We can now define several useful notions. A plurality𝑥𝑥 is closed under conected-
nesswhen for all 𝑦 and 𝑧, if 𝑦 is among the 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦 is connected to 𝑧, then 𝑧 is among
the 𝑥𝑥. A plurality 𝑥𝑥 is a subplurality of another plurality 𝑦𝑦 when every 𝑥 that is
among the 𝑥𝑥 is also among the 𝑦𝑦. A universe is a non-empty plurality that is closed
under connectedness and inwhich every pair of individuals is connected. Amultiverse
is a plurality that is closed under connectedness in which some pair of individuals is not
connected.
Inwhat follows, itwill be helpful to talk about pluralities of universes. But this raises
21. A full model-theoretic description ofCI is included in the appendix.
22. The formula𝜙 is allowed to be an open formula with with both individual and plural free variables,
though 𝑥𝑥 is not allowed to occur free in 𝜙.
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an immediate complication. For universes themselves are pluralities of individuals, so
pluralities of universes would have to be pluralities of pluralities. That is, pluralities of
universes would have to be plupluralities. But our immutabilist language has no syntax
for talking about plupluralities. So it would seem that we have no way to talk about
pluralities of universes.
Our solution will be to identify pluralities of universes with the plurality of individ-
uals in those universes. Thus, suppose that we have two universes 𝑢1 and 𝑢2. What we
are going to call the plurality of 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 is then just the plurality of individuals that
are in either𝑢1 or𝑢2. Or putting it anotherway, whatwe are going to call aplurality of
universes is just a plurality of individuals closed under connectedness. Wewill then say
that a universe 𝑥𝑥 is among a plurality 𝑦𝑦 of universes when the 𝑥𝑥 are a subplurality
of the 𝑦𝑦.
2.3 Principles
There are many ways to be a compossible immutabilist. The core of the view, though,
consists of two principles.
Immutability 2∀𝑥1 …2∀𝑥𝑛2(𝑅(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) ⊃ 2(Exists(𝑥1) ∧
… ∧ Exists(𝑥𝑛) ⊃ 𝑅(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)))
Compossibility 2∀𝑥𝑥2∀𝑦𝑦3(Exists(𝑥𝑥) ∧ Exists(𝑦𝑦))
Immutability says that if things stand in a relation then, necessarily, they stand in that
relation, so long as they all exist.23,24 Thinking of properties as one-place relations, this
entails that if something has a property, then it has that property necessarily, so long as
it exists.
Compossibility says that given any two possible pluralities, it could have been that
those pluralities existed together. Our background logic includes Everything. Thus, in
terms of worlds, Compossibility entails that given any twoworlds, there is a third world
23. Immutability is a schema. Thus, 𝑅 can be replaced by any basic predicate in the language. These
predicates may include predicates with argument places taking plural terms. In that case, the singular
variables and singular quantifiers will need to be replaced with plural variables and plural quantifiers. The
same will apply for any other schemas given throughout the rest of this paper.
Note that our language does not have lambda abstraction, which would let us convert arbitrary
conditions into complex predicates. Even if it did, lambda abstracts are not basic predicates, and so will
not be substitution instances.
24. Singular and plural existence predicates are defined in the usual way.
Exists(𝑥) ≡𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∃𝑦(𝑥 = 𝑦)
Exist(𝑥𝑥) ≡𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∃𝑦𝑦(𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦)
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in which everything from the first two exists together.
There is a sense in which Immutability, on its own, does not capture the full
immutabilist picture. For the immutabilist says that there is no contingency with
respect to how things are, only contingency with respect to what exists. The problem is
that while Immutability guarantees that things are immutable across worlds in which
they exist, it does not guarantee that things are immutable across worlds in which they
fail to exist.
My own preference is to solve the problem by adopting serious actualism. This is
the view that things have properties and stand in relations only when they exist.25
Actuality 2∀𝑥1 …2∀𝑥𝑛2(𝑅(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) ⊃ Exists(𝑥1) ∧ … ∧
Exists(𝑥𝑛))
Actuality guarantees that non-existing things never have properties nor stand in relation.
Thus, there is no concern that non-existent things could have had different properties
or stood in different relations.
For those who are not serious actualists, an alternative would be to replace Im-
mutability with a stronger principle.
Strong Immutability 2∀𝑥1 …2∀𝑥𝑛2(𝑅(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) ⊃
2(𝑅(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)))
Strong Immutability says that if things stand in a relation, then necessarily, they stand
in that relation regardless of whether they exist. In contrast, Immutability only says
that if things stand in a relation then, necessarily, they stand in that relation assuming
that they exist.
Compossibility tells us that two possible worlds can always be pasted together.
There is still the question, though, of when worlds can be cut apart. For my own
part, I accept the following two principles:
Coexistence 2∀𝑥2∀𝑦2(𝑥 ∼ 𝑦 ≡ 2(Exists(𝑥) ≡ Exists(𝑦)))
Separability 2∀𝑥𝑥3(Exists(𝑥𝑥) ∧ ∀𝑦∃𝑥(𝑥 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ∧ 𝑥 ∼ 𝑦))
Coexistence says necessarily, if two things are connected, then they are necessarily
coexistent. Thus, existence is a holisticmatter. When one thing from apossible universe
exists, then everything else from that possible universe exists as well. Separability says
25. We are going to restrict the substitution instances of 𝑅 to non-logical predicates. Thus, things are
allowed to stand in logical relations, even when they fail to exist. The view that things fail to stand in
even logical relations when they fail to exists is a view that you might call very serious actualism. I have no
particular opposition to very serious actualism, but it creates additional complications, which would be a
distraction from the task at hand.
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that necessarily, given any things, it could have been that those things existed, and that
every thing was in the same universe as at least one of them. Given Coexistence, you
can think of this as the claim that given a plurality of universes, those universes could
have existed without any others.
Note that given Coexistence, the immutabilist could drop connectedness as a basic
predicate. This is because she can define connectedness with:
𝑥 ∼ 𝑦 ≡𝑑𝑒𝑓 2(Exists(𝑥) ≡ Exists(𝑦)) (11)
Thus, what it is for two things to be in the same universe is for them to be necessarily
coexistent. There are several advantages to this approach. One is that that there is no
need to treat Coexistence as a basic axiom. Another is that there is no longer any need
for axioms saying that connectedness is an equivalence relation, since these will follow
from the background logic, given (11).
Our systemCI includes Immutability, Compossibility, Actuality, Coexistence, and
Separability. It thus represents what you might think of as cut-and-paste theory of
modality. For example, suppose that we start with world 𝑤1 below, with the hexes
being universes. Coexistence and Separability then tells us that we can cut 𝑤1 apart,
𝑤1 𝑤2 𝑤3
so long as we are careful to cut around universes, and not through them. Thus, the
possibility of 𝑤1 entails the existence of 𝑤2 and 𝑤3. On the other hand, suppose that
we start with 𝑤2 and 𝑤3. Compossibility then tells us that we can paste these worlds
together to get 𝑤1. Immutability and Coexistence ensure that when worlds are cut
apart or pasted together, universes remain the same intrinsically. Actuality ensures that
there are no changes with respect to non-existing universes. Thus, the only differences
across worlds are with respect to which universes there are.
Compossibility says that two worlds can always be pasted together. Alternatively,
though, you could accept something stronger. Namely:
Possible Pluriverse 3∃𝑥𝑥2∀𝑥(𝑥 ≺ 𝑥𝑥)
This says that there could have been a pluriverse, where a pluriverse is a plurality that
includes every possible individual. Thus, where Compossibility says that two worlds
can always be pasted together, Possible Pluriverse says that all the worldswhatsoever can
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be pasted together.
I am undecided about Possible Pluriverse. In fact, I am somewhat inclined to deny
it. Denying Possible Pluriverse is equivalent to accepting:
Extensibility 2∀𝑥𝑥3∃𝑥(𝑥⊀𝑥𝑥)
This says that necessarily, given any plurality of things, there could have been something
that was not among them. Thus, modality turns out to be indefinitely extensible, in a
certain sense.
Now that we have immutabilism fully on the table, it can be distinguished from
other views in the literature.
Necessitarianism 2∀𝑥1 …2∀𝑥𝑛2(𝜙(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) ⊃ 2(𝜙(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)))
Necessitism 2∀𝑥2(Exists(𝑥))
The first is necessitarianism. This is the view that necessarily, whenever a condition is
satisfied, it is necessarily satisfied. There is thus no contingencywhatsoever. The second
is necessitism. This is the view that necessarily, everything necessarily exists. There is
thus no contingency with respect to what exists, though theremay be contingency with
respect to how things are.
An immutabilist can accept that there is contingency with respect to what exists.
Thus, an immutabilist need not be a necessitist. But necessitarianism is equivalent to
the conjunction of necessitism and immutabilism. Thus, an immutabilist need not be
a necessitarian either.
In fact, our own systemCI includes Plural Comprehension, which entails Nothing.
But it also includes Separability. These together entail that there could have been
nothing. Given the background modal logic, this in turn entails:
Strong Contingentism 2∀𝑥3(¬Exists(𝑥))
Strong Contingentism says that necessarily, everything is contingent. Thus, there are
no necessarily existing things, nor could there have been.
As we noted earlier, compossible immutabilism is one immutabilist view. Another
is Leibnizian immutabilism. Leibnizian immutabilism says that individuals are always
worldbound. It thus accepts:
Worldbound 2∀𝑥1 …2∀𝑥𝑛(𝜙(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) ⊃ 2(Exists(𝑥𝑛) ⊃
𝜙(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)))
This says that necessarily, every individual is such that necessarily, had anything been
any different, it would not have existed. Worldbound entails Immutability, and so Leib-
nizian immutabilism is a genuine form of immutabilism. A compossible immutabilist,
though, cannot acceptWorldbound, since it is inconsistent with Compossibility, given
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minimal assumptions.26 Thus, compossible immutabilism and Leibniz immutabilism
are incompatible.
2.4 De Re Contingency
The most obvious objection to immutabilism is that it simply gets the modal facts
wrong. The mug onmy desk is blue, but could have been a different color. Socrates is a
philosopher, but could have been a mathematician instead. Thus, immutabilism fails
because it is simply false that things always have their properties and relations necessarily.
There are various responses an immutabilist couldmake. Here, wewill consider two.
The first is to distinguish between fundamental and non-fundamental individuals. The
fundamental individuals are the basic building blocks of reality. These might include
things like particles. Everything else is non-fundamental. These include things like cars,
trees, and coffee mugs. A similar distinction can be drawn between fundamental and
non-fundamental properties and relations.
An immutabilist might then restrict her immutabilism to the fundamental. That
is, as a matter of necessarily, when fundamental things stand in fundamental relation,
then they necessarily stand in that relation, whenever they exist. This allows ordinary
things, which are not fundamental, to be mutable.
Youmight object that this still gets themodal facts wrong, since fundamental things
are also mutable. But why think that? Maybe common sense suggests that they are.
But even if so, there is no reason to expect common sense to be a reliable guide to the
metaphysics of fundamental things, like particles.
The second response is to distinguish between two kinds of modality. On the one
hand, there is fundamental modality, which is what the immutabilist uses when doing
physics. On the other hand, there is ordinary modality, which is the stuff of common
sense.
The immutabilist, then, might claim that her immutabilism is restricted to fun-
damental modality. Thus, her view is that necessarily (in the fundamental sense), if
individuals stand in a relation, it is necessary (in the fundamental sense) that they stand
in that relation, assuming they exist. But this is compatible with the view that there are
individuals that could (in the ordinary sense) have stood in different relations.
The challenge for the immutabilist, then, is to show that she can explain the ordinary
modal facts, which are mutabilist, in terms of the fundamental modal facts, which are
immutabilist.
One way to do this would be to use counterpart theory. To see how this goes,
26. Those minimal assumptions being3∃𝑥3∃𝑦(¬Exists(𝑥)).
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suppose that an immutabilist wants to explain the fact that:
Socrates could have been a mathematician. (12)
Thinking in terms of worlds, the actual world 𝑤1 is a world in which Socrates is a
philosopher and not a mathematician. This world, we can suppose, has exactly one




might then say that Socrates could have been a mathematician in 𝑤1 because there is a
possible world 𝑤2 in which there is a counterpart of Socrates who is a mathematician.
Call this counterpart Archimedes. This world, we can suppose, has exactly one universe
𝑢2.
This explanation almost works. The problem is that it requires a cross-modal
counterpart relation between Archimedes in 𝑤2 and Socrates in 𝑤1. But how are such
cross-modal relations to be understood?
The immutabilist solution is to reduce relations across worlds to relations within
worlds. Here is how that works in the present case: Given Compossibility, there is a
third world 𝑤3 in which the universe 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 exist together in a multiverse. This is






the immutabilist claims, then, is that Archimedes in 𝑤2 is a counterpart of Socrates in
𝑤1 because Archimedes 𝑤3 is a counterpart of Socrates in 𝑤3. Putting this all into the
27. A non-trivial counterpart of Socrates is a counterpart who is also non-identical.
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official language, the proposal is to explain (12) with:
3∃𝑥(Math(𝑠) ∧ ∧3(Cpt(𝑥, 𝑠))) (13)
Thus, it could (in the ordinary sense) have been that Socrates was a mathematician
because it could (in the fundamental sense) have been that there was someone who
was a mathematician who could (in the fundamental sense) have been a counterpart of
Socrates.28
Nowhold on, youmight say. Maybe Socrates andArchimedes are different inworld
𝑤3 than they are inworld𝑤1 and𝑤2. Thus, theymay be counterparts inworld𝑤3. But
this tells us nothing aboutwhether Archimedes inworld𝑤2 is a counterpart of Socrates
in world 𝑤1. Thus, we cannot use the fact that Archimedes in 𝑤3 is a counterpart of
Socrates in𝑤3 as a proxy for the fact that Archimedes in𝑤2 is a counterpart of Socrates
in 𝑤1.
The immutabilist, though, has a ready response. Necessarily, everything is im-
mutable. Thus, Socrates and Archimedes do not differ across worlds because nothing
differs across worlds. Thus, if Archimedes in𝑤3 is a counterpart of Socrates in𝑤3, this
is enough to ensure that Archimedes in 𝑤2 is a counterpart of Socrates in 𝑤1.
Once again, this almost works, but there is still a concern. Immutability guarantees
that Socrates andArchimedes are held fixed acrossworlds. With the help ofCoexistence,
it also guarantees that the universes they inhabit are held fixed across worlds. But still,
the counterpart relation might be sensitive to facts about which other universes exist,
and those facts are not held fixed across worlds.29
To illustrate the general problem: Suppose that Socrates in𝑤1 is the smartest person
in theworld. Moreover, suppose that being the smartest person in theworld is necessary
and sufficient for being a counterpart of Socrates. Next, suppose that Archimedes in
𝑤2 is the smartest person in the world though, as it turns out, Archimedes in 𝑤2 is
somewhat less keen than Socrates in 𝑤1. In that case, Archimedes in 𝑤2 may be a
counterpart of Socrates in𝑤1. But Archimedes in𝑤3 is not a counterpart of Socrates in
28. There is a complication here. Socrates is not fundamental. Neither is the property of being a
mathematician nor the relation of being a counterpart. Thus, the fundamental language will not have
any corresponding names or predicates. But then how are we explaining ordinary modal facts in terms of
fundamental modal facts?
While this is left implicit in the main text, the proposed explanation goes in stages. First, we explain
the immutabilist modal facts about non-fundamental individuals (like Socrates) and non-fundamental
properties and relations (like being a mathematician and being a counterpart) in terms of fundamental
immutabilist modal facts involving fundamental individuals (like particles) and fundamental relations
(like betweenness and congruence). We then use these mid-level immutabilist modal facts to explain the
ordinary mutabilist modal facts using counterpart theory.
29. Thanks to Ted Sider for raising this objection.
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𝑤3. After all, Socrates is the smartest person in world𝑤3, and so is his only counterpart.
Thus, there is no way to reduce the counterpart relation spanning 𝑤2 and 𝑤1 with a
counterpart relation within 𝑤3.
Putting the pointmore generally, we can distinguish between two kinds of relations.
Steady relations are ones that hold across possible universes, regardless ofwhether those
universes are in separate worlds or the same world, so long as the intrinsic character of
each universe is held fixed. Unsteady relations are relations that do not. The objection,
then, is that the counterpart relation may be unsteady. But the proposed strategy for
reducing counterpart relations across worlds only works if counterpart relations are
steady.
We could respond by insisting that counterpart relations are always steady. For my
own part, I suspect that this might be. Still, it would be nice to have a less dogmatic
solution.
One approach is to to use a counterpart relation with plural indexing. Thus, facts
involving the ordinary two-place counterpart relation are explained using a four-place
counterpart relation.
Ctp(𝑥, 𝑥𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑦𝑦) (14)
Read this as saying that 𝑥 relative to the 𝑥𝑥 is a counterpart of 𝑦 relative to the 𝑦𝑦. Or
somewhat more intuitively, 𝑥 is a counterpart of 𝑦, thinking of the 𝑥𝑥 as the entire
world that 𝑥 inhabits and the 𝑦𝑦 as the entire world that 𝑦 inhabits.
We can now return to our problematic case. What we want to explain is why
Archenemies in 𝑤2 is a counterpart of Socrates in 𝑤1. The only universe in 𝑤1 is
𝑢1 and the only universe in 𝑤2 is 𝑢2. What we claim, then, is that Archenemies in
𝑤2 is a counterpart of Socrates in 𝑤1 because in world 𝑤3, Socrates is a counterpart
of Archimedes, thinking of 𝑢1 as the entire world that Socrates inhabits and 𝑢2 as the
entire world that Archimedes inhabits. This is true, despite the fact that in𝑤3, Socrates
is not a counterpart of Archimedes, thinking of the plurality that includes both 𝑢1 and
𝑢2 as the world that they both inhabit.
Summing up: The immutabilist can reduce ordinary de re modal claims using
counterpart theory. This would seem to require counterpart relations across worlds.
But those counterpart relations across worlds can be reduced to counterpart relations
within worlds. This can be done because the immutabilist accepts both Compossibility
and Immutability.30
30. There are further potential complications here. The counterpart theory we briefly sketched is
broadly Lewisian. Lewisian counterpart theory, though, is materially inadequate in certain respects.
Solutions generally involve quantifying over things like functions, sequences, or relations. But in that
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2.5 Cross-Modal Comparisons
We saw in the last section that the immutabilist can explain cross-modal counterpart
relationship. The basic strategy was to reduce relations across worlds to relations within
worlds. That same strategy can also be used to explain cross-modal comparisons.
Suppose that we want to explain the fact that Socrates could have been taller than






can suppose, is the only non-trivial counterpart of Socrates in 𝑤1. We then claim that
Socrates could have been taller than he actually is in 𝑤1 because there is a world 𝑤2 in
which there is someone who is a counterpart of Socrates in 𝑤1 and taller than Socrates
is in 𝑤1. Call this counterpart Archimedes.
This almost works. The problem is that we need two relations across worlds. First,
we need a counterpart relation between Archimedes in 𝑤2 and Socrates in 𝑤1. Second,
we need a taller than relation between Archimedes in 𝑤2 and Socrates in 𝑤1.
Fortunately, both of these relations across worlds can be reduced to relations within
worlds. By Compossibility, there is a third world 𝑤3 in which both 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 exist.
Hence, this is a world in which Socrates and Archimedes both exist. Moreover, this is a
world in which Archimedes is both a counterpart of Socrates and taller than Socrates.
Hence, Archimedes in 𝑤2 is both a counterpart of Socrates in 𝑤1 and taller than
Socrates in 𝑤1. Putting this all into the official immutabilist language, Socrates could
have been taller than he actually is because:
3(∃𝑥3(Cpt(𝑥, 𝑠) ∧ Taller(𝑥, 𝑠))) (15)
This says that it could have been that there was someone who could have been both a
counterpart of Socrates and taller than Socrates.
You might worry that (15) misses the mark. After all, suppose that Archimedes
case, how is a nominalist going to do counterpart theory? My own preference is to use a conventional
permissibility operator in place of such quantification. Another option would be for a nominalist to do
counterpart theory within a mathematical fiction. The result will be a fictionalism about ordinary modal
claims that roughly matches her fictionalism about mathematics. This is not the place, though, to get into
the details of either proposal.
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in world 𝑤3 is taller than Socrates. Still, it might be that Socrates and Archimedes are
different heights in𝑤3 than they are in𝑤1 and𝑤2. Thus, from the fact thatArchimedes
is taller than Socrates in 𝑤3, it does not follow that Archimedes in 𝑤2 is taller than
Socrates in 𝑤1.
The immutabilist, though, will insist that it does. Her view is precisely that nothing
ever differs acrossworlds. As such, the height of Socrates andArchimedes does not differ
across worlds. The taller than relation is a steady relation. So the fact that Archimedes
in𝑤3 is taller than Socrates in𝑤3 is enough to guarantee that Archimedes in𝑤2 is taller
than Socrates in 𝑤1.
Another concern you might have is that while the immutabilist can explain some
cross-modal comparisons, she cannot explain those in which the existence of a multi-
verse is explicitly denied. For example, consider the claim that:
Socrates could have been taller than he actually is without having
been in a multiverse.
(16)
An immutabilist, though, can explain these sorts of facts as well. Thinking in terms of
our above diagram, suppose that Socrates in 𝑤1 could have been taller than he actually
is, without having been in a multiverse. This is true, the immutabilist claims, because
there is aworld𝑤2 inwhich there is someonewho is not in amultiverse. Call this person
Archimedes. Archimedes in 𝑤2 is then a counterpart of Socrates in 𝑤1 and taller than
Socrates in 𝑤1. This is because there is a third world 𝑤3 in which Archimedes and
Socrates both exist. Moreover, Archimedes in 𝑤3 is both a counterpart of Socrates in
𝑤3 and taller than Socrates in 𝑤3. Putting this all in terms of the official language, (16)
is explained with:
3∃𝑥(∀𝑦(𝑥 ∼ 𝑦) ∧ 3(Cpt(𝑥, 𝑠) ∧ Taller(𝑥, 𝑠))) (17)
Thus, Socrates could have been taller than he actually is, without having been in a
multiverse, because it could have been that there was someone, who was not in a
multiverse, who could have been both a counterpart of Socrates and taller than Socrates.
3 Fictionalism
We described compossible immutabilism in the §2. This lets us solve the problem of
cross-modal comparisons, which was posed in §1.3. We are now going tomove towards
giving a theory of distance ratios in §4. That project will be made easier, though, if we
have an additional tool.
That tool is pluriverse fictionalism. According to the pluriverse fiction, there is
vast plurality of concrete universes that includes every possible universe. Because we are
interested in nominalism, our pluriverse fiction will be a nominalist pluriverse fiction.
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According to the fiction, there are no numbers or universals or other things of that sort.
Thus, according to the fiction, modal realism is true, but Platonism is not.
What we are going to show in the appendix is that fictionalist talk about the
pluriverse is structurally equivalent to immutabilist talk in terms of operators. Thus,
any fictionalist theory𝑇𝐹 can be directly translated into an immutabilist theory𝑇𝐼 with
the same logical structure.
This suggests a natural approach to building immutabilist scientific theories. First,
we build a physical theory 𝑇𝐹 in the pluriverse fiction. To show that this theory is
empirically adequate, we expand the fiction to include an appropriate set theory. This
gives us a combinedfiction inwhichwe canprove thenecessary representation theorems.
Once we have those, we prove conservativeness. This establishes that 𝑇𝐹 is empirically
adequate. We then translate the fictionalist theory𝑇𝐹 to the immutabilist theory𝑇𝐼. 𝑇𝐼
is structurally equivalent to 𝑇𝐹. Structural equivalence preserves empirical adequacy.
Thus, since the fictionalist theory 𝑇𝐹 is empirically adequate, so is the immutabilist
theory 𝑇𝐼.
The advantage of this procedure is that as an immutabilist, you cando sciencewithin
the pluriverse fiction. You can also build immutabilist theory directly, if you want. But
for my own part, I find it easier to work in the pluriverse fiction, and then translate the
results.
In the rest of this section, we are going to build a fictionalist language and logic that
an immutabilist can use to build scientific theories. Those readers who trust that this
can be done should feel free to skip ahead to §4.
3.1 Language
We are going to think of the fictionalist as having plural language ℒ𝐹. This has much
of the same syntax as the immutabilist language from §2.2.
Singular variables 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, …
Plural variables 𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧, …
Singular quantifiers ∃𝑥 and ∀𝑥
Plural quantifiers ∃𝑥𝑥 and ∀𝑥𝑥
Truth-functional operators ∧, ∨, ⊃, ¬
Logical predicates =𝑠, =𝑝, ≺, ∼
There are also important differences, though. Unlike the immutabilist language, the
fictionalist language has no modal operators. Instead, it has an actuality predicate:
Act(𝑥) 𝑥 is actual
Thus, the fictionalist draws a basic distinction between actual and non-actual individ-
uals. The immutabilist has no need for such a distinction, since her quantifiers only
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range over actual individuals.
These are all the basic resources of the fictionalist language. It will be helpful,
though, to also have a slate of defined plural predicates.
Act(𝑥𝑥) the 𝑥𝑥 are actual
Clo(𝑥𝑥) the 𝑥𝑥 are closed under connectedness
Uni(𝑥𝑥) the 𝑥𝑥 are a universe
Multi(𝑥𝑥) the 𝑥𝑥 are a multiverse
The plural actuality predicate is defined using the singular actuality predicate.31 The
rest are defined using the connectedness relation, as they were in §2.2. As before, we
will talk about pluralities of universes, but these pluralities of universes are in fact just
pluralities of individuals, which are closed under connectedness.
3.2 Pluralism about Worlds
We have a fictionalist language then. This language has the resources for talking about
universes, along with which of those universes are actual. This brings us to a natural
question: What are possible worlds?
When it comes to either fictionalism or modal realism, we can distinguish between
two views. The singularist says that a possible world is an individual universe. The
pluralist says that a possible world is any plurality of universes whatsoever.
In visual terms, the singularist says that the pluriverse is as illustrated on the left.
The hexes are universes and the boxes are worlds. The pluralist, on the other hand,
says that the pluriverse is as illustrated on the right. For the pluralist, any plurality of
universes whatsoever counts as a possible world. This is hard to illustrate, though, so
we have included only a selection of worlds. Some have only one universe. Some have
many.
Following David Lewis (2001), fictionalists and modal realists have generally been
singularists. But singularism faces two serious problems. The first is that there is no
31. Act(𝑥𝑥) ≡𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∀𝑥(𝑥 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ⊃ Act(𝑥))
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possible world in which there is a multiverse. The second is that there is no possible
world in which there is nothing. But there could have been a multiverse and there could
have been nothing. So singularism would seem to be materially inadequate.32
Pluralism avoids both problems. There can be pluralities of universes that contain
many universes. Hence, there can be possible worlds in which there is a multiverse.
There can also be an empty plurality. The empty plurality is trivially closed under
connectedness. So there can also be a possible world in which there is nothing.
Our fictionalist is going to be a pluralist about possible worlds. This means that we
will also have a defined plural world predicate.33
World(𝑥𝑥) the 𝑥𝑥 are a possible world
Thus, when the fictionalist says that there is a possible world, what she really means is
that there are things that together form a possible world.
3.3 Principles
We have both a fictionalist language and a view about possible worlds. What we want
to do now is find principles that guarantee that fictionalist talk can always be translated
as immutabilist talk, and visa-versa.
More precisely: Wewant to identify aminimal immutabilist system I and aminimal
fictionalist system F such that any sentence in the immutabilist language ℒ𝐼 can be
translated as a sentence of the fictionalist language ℒ𝐹, and visa-versa, with these
translations preserving logical entailment.
Two such systems are fully specified in the appendix. It will be useful, though, to
say bit about how these systems work in general terms.
The immutabilist system I is strictly weaker than the system CI we built earlier.
One is that Separability and Compossibility are dropped. The other is that Plural
Comprehension is replaced with Everything. Thus, as a plural logic, I is quite weak.
The only plurality whose existence it guarantees is the universal plurality.
The matching fictionalist system F is classical. Thus, unlike I or CI, the system
has classical rules for the quantifiers and axioms guaranteeing the connectedness is an
equivalence relation. There are then other various basic principles, the first three of
32. Lewis raises both objections himself on pp. 72-3 of his (2001). His response is to just bite the bullet.
There could not have been a multiverse, nor could there have been nothing. For other potential solutions,
see Yablo (1999), Sider (2003), Bricker (2001), and Parsons (2007).
33. World(𝑥𝑥) ≡𝑑𝑒𝑓 Clo(𝑥𝑥)
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which have to do with the actuality predicate.
Actual World ∃𝑥𝑥∀𝑦(𝑦 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ≡ Act(𝑦))
Actual Closure ∀𝑥∀𝑦(Act(𝑥) ∧ 𝑥 ∼ 𝑦 ⊃ Act(𝑦))
Actual Names Act(𝑡) when 𝑡 is a name
The first says that there is a plurality of all the things that are actual. The second says
that if one thing in a universe is actual, then everything else in that universe is actual.
The third says that individuals and pluralities with names are actual.
Finally, we have a fourth principle governing how basic relations interact with
possible worlds. This is easiest to state if we have a defined subplurality predicate.34
𝑥𝑥 ≺∗ 𝑦𝑦 the 𝑥𝑥 are a subplurality 𝑦𝑦
When thinking in terms of individuals, the principle says that whenever things stand
in basic relations, there is some possible world in which they all exist.
Relation World ∀𝑥1 … ∀𝑥𝑛(𝑅(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) ⊃ ∃𝑦𝑦(World(𝑦𝑦) ∧
(𝑥1 ≺ 𝑦𝑦 ∧ ⋯ ∧ 𝑥𝑛 ≺ 𝑦𝑦)
This is a schema, though, and we are allowing predicates with plural arguments as
substitution instances. When doing so, the corresponding variables and quantifiers are
replaced with plural variables and quantifiers. The corresponding ≺ predicates are also
replaced with ≺∗ predicates.
Two further principles follow from this one. Individuals andpluralities always stand
in identity relations to themselves. Thus, RelationWorld gives us :
Possible Individuals ∀𝑥∃𝑦𝑦(World(𝑦𝑦) ∧ 𝑥 ≺ 𝑦𝑦)
Possible Pluralities ∀𝑥𝑥∃𝑦𝑦(World(𝑦𝑦) ∧ 𝑥𝑥 ≺∗ 𝑦𝑦))
The first says that every possible individual is in a world. The second says that every
possible plurality is also in a world.
This gives us the systems we wanted. Any fictionalist theory in F can be translated
as an immutabilist theory in I, and visa-versa. The translations are provided in the
appendix. The basic idea, though, is that fictional quantification over the pluriverse
is translated as modalized quantification. Quantification over worlds is translated
using modal operators. There is some complexity involving the actuality predicate but,
otherwise, everything else is left the same. Going the other way, immutabilist modal
operators are translated using quantification over worlds. Immutabilist quantifiers are
34. 𝑥𝑥 ≺∗ 𝑦𝑦 ≡𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∀𝑧(𝑧 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ⊃ 𝑧 ≺ 𝑦𝑦)
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translated as restricted quantifiers.
Once we have our translations, there are certain striking connections between the
principle we might accept on the fictionalist side and the principles we might accept
on the immutabilist side. For example, suppose we accept full Plural Comprehension
on the fictionalist side. When translated, this corresponds to accepting not only Plural
Comprehension, but also Possible Pluriverse and Separability on the immutabilist side.
Or going the other way, suppose we accept Possible Pluriverse on the immutabilist side.
This corresponds to accepting Everything on the fictionalist side.
Finally, it should be pointed that the variety ofmodal fictionalism I support is rather
different than the modal fictionalism described by Rosen (1990, 1995). Rosen aims
to reduce modal facts to facts about the fiction. It could have been that 𝜙 because,
according to the fiction, there is a possible world at which𝜙. My own view is exactly the
reverse: What is true in fiction is true in the fiction because it appropriately represents
the modal facts.35 The pluriverse fiction is thus a useful tool for reasoning about the
modal facts, not a strategy for reducing or eliminating them.
4 Distance Ratios
We are now going to give an immutabilist theory of distance ratios. That theory will
be nominalist, in the sense that it will only quantify over actual particles. The theory
requires comparisons across worlds, so will a compossible immutabilist theory. This
solves the problem of quantities raised in §1.
Our basic approach will be the one suggested at the beginning of §3. That is, we
are going to start by giving a fictionalist theory of distance ratios in §4.1. Thus, we will
be showing how a nominalist could give a theory of distance ratios, if modal realism
were true. But of course, modal realism is not true. So we will translate the fictionalist
theory to an immutabilist theory in §4.2.
4.1 Fictionalist Distance Ratios
Our fictionalist theory will use the fictionalist language from §3.1, extended to include
the betweenness and congruence predicates.36 There are different ways to go here,
but we will think of the fictionalist as accepting a pluriverse of all physically possible
35. Thus, the brand of fictionalism I support has more in common with the non-proxy reduction
strategy from Fine (2005) or the ersatz pluriverse from Sider (2002).
36. In fact, to state the Archimedean axiom, we need a language with some sort of device for saying there
are finitely many. My preferred approach is to add a one-place logical plural predicate Fin(𝑥𝑥) saying
that the 𝑥𝑥 are finite.
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universes, rather than a pluriverse of all metaphysically possible universes.
The general strategy will be to give a theory of distance ratios by using congruence
relations across worlds. But this means that our fictionalist will be departing from
Lewis’s modal realism in yet another important respect.
Lewis says two things about spatiotemporal relations and universes. First, he says
that two things are in the same universe when there is some distance between them.
Second, he says that two things are in the same universe when there are spatiotemporal
relations between them.37
The second condition is problematic because it rules out congruence relations across
universes. After all, congruence relations are spatiotemporal relations. Thus, if there
are no spatiotemporal relations across worlds, there are no congruence relations across
worlds.
Lewis seems to think of his two conditions as equivalent. But in fact, they are very
different. The second is much stronger. Our strategy, then, will be to accept the first
while rejecting the second. Thus, two things are in the same universewhen there is some
distance between them. But two things can stand in spatiotemporal relations without
being in the same universe.
Filling in the details, say that𝑎 and 𝑏 are self-congruentwhen𝑎 and 𝑏 are congruent
with 𝑎 and 𝑏. Our fictionalist thus claims that two things are in the same universe if
and only if they are self-congruent:
∀𝑎∀𝑏(𝑎 ∼ 𝑏 ≡ Cong(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑎, 𝑏)) (18)
There is some distance between two things if and only if they are self-congruent. So this
can also be read as expressing the Lewisian idea that two things are in the same universe
if and only if there is some distance between them.
This allows for congruence relations across universes. For example, consider the
two universes illustrated below. Particles 𝑎 and 𝑏 are in the same universe because they
are self-congruent. Likewise for 𝑐 and 𝑑. Particles 𝑎 and 𝑏 are also congruent with 𝑐
and 𝑑. We can thus use congruence to compare two particles from the first universe
with two particles from the second. What we cannot do is use congruence to relate two
particles from different universes with any other two particles. For example, 𝑎 and 𝑐
cannot be congruent with 𝑏 and 𝑑, nor can 𝑎 and 𝑐 be congruent with 𝑐 and 𝑑.38 Thus,
37. See Lewis (2001, pp.2).
38. Suppose for reduction that 𝑎 and 𝑏 are in different universes, but that 𝑎 and 𝑏 are congruent
with some 𝑥 and 𝑦. By Cong-Symmetry and Cong-Transitivity (which are given below), 𝑎 and 𝑏 are







we are allowing certain congruence relations across worlds, but not others.
Next, we want to rule out betweenness relations across universes. These are not
needed and, moreover, would be problematic.39 Thus:
∀𝑎∀𝑏∀𝑐(Bet(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) ⊃ Cong(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑎, 𝑏) ∧ Cong(𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑏, 𝑐)) (19)
You can read this as saying that 𝑏 is between 𝑎 and 𝑐 only if there is some distance
between 𝑎 and 𝑏 and some distance between 𝑏 and 𝑐. Given (18), this entails that if 𝑏
is between 𝑎 and 𝑐, then all three particles are in the same universe. There are thus no
betweenness relations across universes.
Putting these things together, the basic picture is one on which there is a pluriverse
in which universes are pluralities of spatiotemporally connected particles. For the most
part, there are no basic relations across universes. The only exceptions are certain
congruence relations.
When giving a substantivalist theory of distance ratios, there are twokinds of axioms.
There are existence axioms, which entail that certain spacetime points exist. The other
axioms are what you might call restriction axioms, since they merely restrict how
spacetime points can be arranged.
Our fictionalist theory will also have both existence axioms and restriction axioms.
The difference is that where a substantivalist uses existence axioms to fill space with
points, a fictionalist uses existence axioms to fill the pluriverse with universes.
We are not going to give a full slate of axioms here. For our purposes, though, it will
be useful to have three restriction axioms.
39. This because they would leave the fictionalist vulnerable to shift arguments. For example, suppose
that𝑢1 has exactly two particles𝑎 and 𝑏 and that these particles are exactly one foot apart. If we have cross-
universe betweenness relations, we can define cross-universe colocation relations. We can thus describe one
universe𝑢2 that contains exactly one particle 𝑐 and another universe𝑢3 that contains exactly one particle
𝑑, with 𝑐 colocated with 𝑎 and 𝑑 colocated with 𝑏. Thus, 𝑢2 is just like 𝑢3, except that the location of
everything is shifted by a foot.
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Cong-Symmetry: ∀𝑎∀𝑏∀𝑐∀𝑑(Cong(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑) ⊃ Cong(𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑎, 𝑏)
Cong-Transitivity: ∀𝑎∀𝑏∀𝑐∀𝑑∀𝑒∀𝑓(Cong(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑) ∧ Cong(𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒, 𝑓)
⊃ Cong(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑒, 𝑓))
Three-Segment: ∀𝑎∀𝑏∀𝑐∀𝑑∀𝑒∀𝑓(Cong(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑑, 𝑒) ∧ Bet(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) ∧
Bet(𝑑, 𝑒, 𝑓) ⊃ (Cong(𝑎, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑓) ≡ Cong(𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑒, 𝑓)))
The first says that congruence is symmetric. The second says that congruence is
transitive. The third is a simplified version of what is sometimes called the five-segment
axiom.
As an illustration of an existence axiom, suppose that the substantivalist has an
axiom saying that for any two spacetime points, there is a third somewhere between
them.
∀𝑎∀𝑏∃𝑥(Bet(𝑎, 𝑥, 𝑏)) (20)
For our fictionalist, the analogous axiom will say that for any pair of particles, there is
a pair of duplicates, somewhere in the pluriverse, that have a third particle somewhere
between them.
∀𝑎∀𝑏∃𝑐∃𝑑∃𝑥(Cong(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑) ∧ Bet(𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑑)) (21)
Now suppose that there is a universe 𝑢1 with exactly two particles, as illustrated below.





universe 𝑢2 in which they do exist. Thus, existence axioms, like this one, are what is
used to ensure that the pluriverse is sufficiently plentiful.
Once we have a slate of appropriate axioms, we want to show that the fictionalist
can solve the problem of uniqueness. To simplify a bit, we can suppose that we only
need to show that if 𝑎 and 𝑏 are twice as far apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐, then they are not also three
times as far apart.
Consider a pluriverse with exactly three universes, as pictured on the next page. Our
universe is 𝑢1 and has exactly three particles. We can suppose that 𝑎 and 𝑏 are twice
as far apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐, and so this is the distance ratio that we want to explain. The
fictionalist proposal is that this distance ratio is explained by the existence of a universe









𝑢2 in which the particles 𝑑, 𝑥, 𝑒, and 𝑓 form an equally spaced line. Moreover, 𝑎 and 𝑏
are congruent with 𝑑 and 𝑒, and 𝑏 and 𝑐 are congruent with 𝑒 and 𝑓.
Now suppose for reductio that 𝑎 and 𝑏 are not only twice as far apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐,
but three times as far apart. For the fictionalist, this means that there is a universe 𝑢3
with particles 𝑔, 𝑦, 𝑧, ℎ, and 𝑖 forming an equally spaced line. Moreover, 𝑎 and 𝑏 are
congruent with 𝑔 and ℎ, and 𝑏 and 𝑐 are congruent with ℎ and 𝑖.
Given these assumptions, we can now prove a contradiction using our three
restriction axioms. First, we use symmetry and transitivity to show that𝑑,𝑥, 𝑒, and 𝑓 are
pairwise congruent with 𝑦, 𝑧, ℎ, and 𝑖. By two applications of the three-segment axiom,
we then have Cong(𝑑, 𝑓, 𝑦, 𝑖). Since Cong(𝑑, 𝑓, 𝑔, 𝑖) by symmetry and transitivity,
another application of the three-segment axiom gives us Cong(𝑑, 𝑑, 𝑔, 𝑦). So 𝑔 and 𝑦
are colocated. But 𝑔 and 𝑦 are part of an equally spaced line, so they are not colocated.
So we have a contradiction. Thus, the very same particles in the very sameworld cannot
be both twice as far apart and three times as far apart.
4.2 Immutabilist Distance Ratios
We are now going to sketch our immutabilist theory of distance ratios. The theory uses
an immutabilist language that extends the fictionalist language with a pair of modal
operators. The theory itself is a translation of the fictionalist theory we gave in §4.1
using the translation scheme from the appendix, which was briefly described at the end
of §3.3.
To translate our fictionalist theory, we can start with restriction axioms. The fic-
tionalist claims, for example, that congruence is symmetric. Applying the immutabilist
translation scheme gives:
2∀𝑎2∀𝑏2∀𝑐2∀𝑑(Cong(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑) ⊃ Cong(𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑎, 𝑏)) (22)
Given Actuality, this is equivalent to:
2(∀𝑎∀𝑏∀𝑐∀𝑑(Cong(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑) ⊃ Cong(𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑎, 𝑏)) (23)
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Thus, where the fictionalist says that congruence is symmetric, the immutabilist says
that congruence is necessarily symmetric. Likewise for other restriction axioms.
Now for the existence axioms. Suppose that the fictionalist accepts an existence
axiom saying that, for any pair of particles, there is a duplicate pair of particles with a
third somewhere between them. The immutabilist translation then gives:
2∀𝑎2∀𝑏3∃𝑐3∃𝑑3∃𝑥(Cong(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑) ∧ Bet(𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑑)) (24)
By Actuality and Immutability, this is equivalent to:
2∀𝑎∀𝑏3∃𝑐∃𝑑∃𝑥(Cong(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑) ∧ Bet(𝑐, 𝑥, 𝑑)) (25)
Thus, where the fictionalist says that for any pair of particles, there is a duplicate pair
with a third somewhere between them, the immutabilist says that necessarily, for any
pair of particles, there could have been a duplicate pair with a third somewhere between
them, somewhere in the multiverse.
Putting it another way: The substantivalist uses existence axioms to fill out space-
time and the fictionalist uses them to fill out the pluriverse. The immutabilist, on the
other hand, uses them to fill out the possibilities.
Alright. What we are going to do now is show that an immutabilist can solve the
problem of uniqueness. As before, we can illustrate the basic strategy by showing how
to prove that the very same particles in the very same world cannot be both twice as far
apart and three times as far apart.
Suppose that we have three merely possible universes 𝑢1, 𝑢2, and 𝑢3. The between-
ness and congruence relations within those universes are as illustrated on the preceding
page. The actualworld is𝑤1 andhas exactly oneuniverse, which is𝑢1. This is illustrated








𝑤1 𝑤2 𝑤3 𝑤4
immutabilist, this is explained by the fact that there is a possible world𝑤2 that contains
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both 𝑢1 and 𝑢2. The particles in these universes stand in the cross-universe congruence
relations illustrated on page 34.
So far so good. Now suppose for reductio that besides being twice as far apart, 𝑎
and 𝑏 are also three times as far apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐 at 𝑤1. For the immutabilist, this means
that there is a possible world 𝑤3 that contains 𝑢1 and 𝑢3. The congruence relations
between those universes at 𝑤3 are not, however, as illustrated on page 34. Rather, 𝑎
and 𝑏 are congruent with 𝑔 and ℎ, and 𝑏 and 𝑐 are congruent with ℎ and 𝑖.
We can now derive a contradiction. First, we note that if 𝑤2 and 𝑤3 are both
possible worlds then, by Compossibility, there is a fourth possible world 𝑤4 in which
𝑢1,𝑢2, and𝑢3 all exist. Immutability then tells us that the congruence and betweenness
relations in 𝑤2 and 𝑤3 carry over to 𝑤4. The immutabilist then claims that the three
restriction axioms from §4.1 are not just true, but necessary. But in that case, 𝑤4 is in
fact impossible, since we can prove a contradiction using the same proof we used in the
case of modal realism. Thus, 𝑎 and 𝑏 are not both twice as far apart and three times as
far apart as 𝑏 and 𝑐 in 𝑤1.
This gives the nominalist a solution to the problem of uniqueness. With a bit more
work, she can give a full slate of axioms for an empirically adequate theory of distance
ratios.40 This general strategy works for other quantities as well. And so the nominalist
has a general solution to the problem of quantities, along with a new strategy for doing
science without numbers.
5 State Space
We saw how to use immutabilism to give a theory of distance ratios in §4. One
of the main advantages of the immutabilist approach, as compared to the existing
substantivalist approach from Field (1980), is that it gives the nominalist a natural
strategy for understanding state space. Thus, in this section, we are going to briefly
sketch the problem, and show what an immutabilist theory of state space might look
like, in very general terms. Most of the interesting details will have to be left for another
time.
In his review of ScienceWithout Numbers, David Malament (1982) raises what has
become a serious challenge to nominalism.
The challenge goes like this: In classical physics, the dynamical laws are given
using mathematical Euclidean spacetime.41 This mathematical spacetime is just a
mathematical object with certain formal features. Nominalists, of course, deny that
40. See my Berntson (2021).
41. Or Galilean spacetime or Maxwellean spacetime.
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there are such things. But in that case, how is a nominalist going to state dynamical
laws?
Field’s solution is to trade mathematical spacetime for concrete spacetime. This
concrete spacetime is built out of spacetime points, thought of as concrete material
particulars. Thus, Field’s solution is to be a substantivalist.
The problem, Malament points out, is that modern physics is often formulated
in terms of not just mathematical spacetime, but also mathematical state spaces. A
nominalist cannot accept mathematical state spaces, and so needs to find a concrete
replacement. But what is that concrete replacement going to be? Call thisMalament’s
challenge.
To illustrate the basic problem, Malament uses the case of Hamiltonian mechanics.
His discussion is worth quoting at length:
[I]t is simplest to identify Hamiltonian mechanics by its determination
of a class of mathematical models. Each model is of form ⟨𝑀, Ω𝑎𝑏, 𝐻⟩
where 𝑀 is an even-dimensional manifold, Ω𝑎𝑏 is a symplectic form
on 𝑀, and 𝐻 is a smooth, real-valued (“Hamiltonian”) scalar field on
𝑀. The points of 𝑀 represent “possible dynamical states” of a given
mechanical system. (Ω𝑎𝑏 and 𝐻 jointly determine a “Hamiltonian vector
field” which characterizes the dynamic evolution of the system.) Now
Field can certainly try to tradeΩ𝑎𝑏 and𝐻 in favor of “qualitative relations”
they induce on 𝑀. If successful, he can reformulate the theory so that
its subject matter is the set of “possible dynamical states” (of particular
physical systems) and various relations into which they enter. But this is
no victory at all! Even a generous nominalist like Field cannot feel entitled
to quantify over possible dynamical states.
Hamiltonian mechanics can be thought of as a class of mathematical state spaces.
Each mathematical state space is built using mathematical states, which are just points
in a mathematical structure. These points are characterized using things like sets,
functions, and real numbers.
This means that in order to give a corresponding nominalist theory, we need to
do two things. First, we need to replace the sets, functions, and real numbers used to
characterize mathematical states with intrinsic relations between them. Second, she
needs to replace mathematical states with something concrete.
If we were Platonists, we could replace mathematical states with universals. We
could, for example, replace mathematical states with state relations. These are binary
relations between universes and times. Each such relation is a maximally specific way
for a universe to be at a time. A universe then evolves over time because it stands in
different state relations to different times. But nothing like this strategy is available to
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the nominalist.
One approach to the problem would be to look for empirically equivalent theories
that use something like a concrete four-dimensional spacetime in place ofmathematical
state space. Perhaps this can be done, and the project deserves more attention.42 But
while this may work for some theories, it may not work in others. Thus, the nominalist
has reason to want a more direct—and general—approach to the metaphysics of state
space.
This is not the place to show that we can nominalize any state space theory that
might come along. Nor is it the place to show, in any detail, that we can nominalize
even a relatively simple state space theory like Hamiltonian mechanics. What we want
to do, though, is motivate the idea that a immutabilist could, with some time and effort,
give a nominalist theory of Hamiltonian mechanics.
The basic strategy is the same as before. First, we give a theory of Hamiltonian
mechanics within the pluriverse fiction. Next, we use the combined fiction to prove
empirical adequacy. Once we have that, we can directly translate the original fictionalist
theory into an immutabilist theory. That translation procedure preserves empirical
adequacy. So the resulting immutabilist theory is also empirically adequate.
To start, then, we will have a fictional pluriverse populated with slices. These are
what youmight think of as time-slices of universes. Slices aremuch larger than ordinary
concrete particulars like cars, trees, and coffeemugs. Their existence is alsomuch briefer.
Still, neither of these are serious grounds for denying that slices are concrete particulars.
Thus, the nominalist can use them to build a fictional pluriverse.
The character of each slice is fixed by what we will call structural relations. So for
example, we might fix the number of particles in each slice by using an at least as many
particles relation between slices. Slices with zero particles are slices such that there are
no slices with strictly fewer particles. Slices with exactly one particle are slices such that
the only slices with strictly fewer particles are slices with zero particles. And so on.
Suppose that after some time, we have selected enough structural relations to fix the
positions of particles, along with their momentum.43 We then need to add temporal
relations to our fictional pluriverse. For these, we could use temporal betweenness and
temporal congruence.
TempBet(a, b, c)
TempCong(a, b, c, d)
The first says that 𝑏 is temporally between 𝑎 and 𝑐. The second is temporal congruence.
It says that the duration between 𝑎 and 𝑏 is the same as the duration between 𝑐 and
42. See for example Chen (2017).
43. To see one way in which this might be done, see Schroeren (2020).
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𝑑. These can be used to fix duration ratios between slices in much the same way that
spatial betweenness and congruence can be used to fix distance ratios between particles.
Once we have both structural relations and temporal relations, we need universes.
That is, we need to saywhich slices are connected. One answer is that they are connected
when they are temporally self-congruent.
𝑎 ∼ 𝑏 ≡ TempCong(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑎, 𝑏) (26)
Or perhaps more intuitively, two slices are in the same universe when there is some
temporal duration between them.
Once we have our basic relations between states, we need laws governing them.
There will be laws governing the structural relations. There will also be laws governing
the temporal relations. Importantly, there will also be dynamical laws telling us how
temporal relations are determined, given the structural relations. Thus, the dynamical
laws will tell us which slices are connected, and so which slices form universes.
This gives us a pluriverse like the one illustrated below. Hexes represent slices. There
are lines between slices that are temporally connected. This gives us three strands of
slices. Each strand is a universe. The dynamical laws determine which slices stand in
temporal relations and, so, which slices form universes. Slices that are not connected
with lines do not form universes. Thus, take the three slices on either diagonal. These
slices are not temporally connected, and so do not form a universe
There is good reason to think, then, that we can give a theory of Hamiltonian
mechanics within the pluriverse fiction. But once we have such a theory, it can be
directly translated into an immutabilist theory. That immutabilist theory will be one
in which the pluriverse has been “cut up” and distributed across various worlds. For
example, perhaps the actual world is𝑤1, with our universe being the only universe. The
𝑤1 𝑤2 𝑤3
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character of our universe is then fixed, not by comparisons of states in our universe with
states in other universes—for there are no other universes. Rather, the character is fixed
by how the states in our universe could have compared to the states in other universes.
6 Objections
Immutabilism depends on the possibility of a multiverse. This, you might say, is a
substantial claimaboutphysical reality. After all, amultiversemight simplybephysically
impossible. Thus, the immutabilist strategy cannot succeed.
In response: I prefer immutabilist theories that require only physical possibility
and necessity. But the immutabilist strategy itself is quite general, and compatible with
other views. Thus, if you think that a multiverse is physically impossible, you could use
a broader notion of possibility instead.
That said, I also maintain that a multiverse is physically possible. Moreover, our
reason for thinking so are roughly the same as our reason for thinking that anything is
physically possible.
By way of analogy: Is it physically possible for the stars to have spelled out the first
line a Shakespearean sonnet? Surely yes. But what reason do we have for thinking so?
The reason, it seems to me, is that such scenarios are consistent with laws as we know
them. Moreover, there are no clear theoretical advantages to denying that such scenarios
are possible.
The same is true when it comes to the possibility of a multiverse. A world in which
there are many universes governed would seem to be compatible with the laws as we
know them. Moreover, there is no serious theoretical advantage to denying such possi-
bilities.44 In fact, quite the opposite, given our present discussion of immutabilism.
This brings us to a second objection. Immutabilism describes the world using
a language with modal operators. Thus, you might object to immutabilism on the
grounds that it requires fundamental modality. But fundamental reality is not filled
with threats and promises, or so you might say.
In response: We started by distinguishing between scientific nominalism and
metaphysical nominalism. We then set out to defend scientific nominalism, which
meant showing that we can construct certain kinds of scientific theories. The theories
we built have modal operators, which are not defined in other terms within the theory.
That much is true.
But all of this is compatible with a wide range of views about how fundamental
44. There is an interesting question about whether monism gives us reason to deny the possibility of a
multiverse. See Schaffer (2013), Baron and Tallant (2016), and Siegel (2016). My own view is that it does
not, but this is a question that will have to be left for another time.
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scientific theories relate to fundamental reality. You could think that fundamental
scientific theories describe a non-fundamental level of metaphysical reality. You could
think that talk about fundamental reality is confused or misguided. Thus, nothing
immediately follows regarding whether or not modality is fundamental.
In my own case, I think modality probably is fundamental. The question, though,
is why we should think this is a serious cost?
Many of us are inclined to accept basic modal notions for other reasons. I myself
am anti-Humean about laws. In particular, I say that when a proposition is a law, it
is a law in virtue of being a metaphysical necessity. But in that case, I already have a
fundamental notions of physical necessity. Thus, using physical necessity to also do
science without numbers comes at no additional cost.
7 Conclusion
We started in §1 by describing scientific nominalism and one of the main challenges
that it faces, which is what Field calls the problem of quantities. One natural idea is
to solve the problem by using modality. But this solution, it turns out, would seem to
depend on having a nominalist strategy for expressing cross-modal comparisons.
We thus described a new view about modality in §2 called compossible immutabil-
ism. That new view allows nominalists to make cross-modal comparisons, and so solve
the main problem standing in the way of a nominalist theory of quantities.
§3 developed a fictionalist language for building theories that can be converted into
immutabilist theories. We thenused this new language to help build a nominalist theory
of distance ratios in §4. In §5, we quickly described how compossible immutabilism
might help the nominalist understand state space theories. And in §6, we considered a
range of objections.
Compossible immutabilism is gives the nominalist new tools for doing science
without numbers. Now, we just need to put those tools to work, and see what sorts of
theories we can built.
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Appendix: Models, Translations, and Structural Equivalence
In this appendix, we are going to build frames and models, and then use them to give a
model-theoretic specification of the systemsCI, I, and F from the main text. We will
then provide recursive translation from the sentence ofℒ𝐼 to the sentences ofℒ𝐹, and
visa-versa, that preserve logical entailment, relative to the system I and F. Thus, given
any immutabilist theory 𝑇𝐼 in system I, there is a structurally equivalent fictionalist
theory 𝑇𝐹 in F, and visa-versa.
Definition 7.1: A frame is a tuple ⟨𝑊, @, 𝐷, 𝑃⟩. This includes a set of worlds𝑊 ⊂
𝑃, an actual world @ ∈ 𝑊, a singular domain 𝐷, and a plural domain 𝑃 ⊂ 𝒫(𝐷).
Moreover, every frame also meets the following conditions:
For every 𝑥 ∈ 𝐷, there is some 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 such that 𝑥 ∈ 𝑤.
For every 𝑥 ∈ 𝑃, there is some 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 such that 𝑥 ⊆ 𝑤.
Each of the worlds in a frame is a set of individuals. Thus, you might think of each
world as being identifiedwith its domain. Eachworld is also in the plural domain. Thus,
each world is also a plurality. The two indented conditions tell us that every individual
is in a world, and so every individual is a possible individual. Likewise, every plurality
is in a world. Thus, every plurality is also a possible plurality. Finally, given any frame,
we can define a plural domain function 𝑝 ∶ 𝑤 ↦ 𝒫(𝑤) ∩ 𝑃.
As we go on, it will be helpful to establish a notational convention. Suppose that we
have a world 𝑤 and a predicate 𝑅. Predicates have sorted argument places. Worlds also
have both a singular domain and a plural domain. Thus, it will be helpful to have some
notation for pairing each argument place of a predicate with the appropriate domain
for a world. For this, we will use 𝛿𝑤𝑖 , where 𝛿𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤when the i-th argument place of𝑅
is singular, and 𝛿𝑤𝑖 = 𝑝(𝑤) when the i-th place of 𝑅 is plural. When the superscript is
dropped, 𝛿𝑖 will refer to the appropriate outer domain for each argument place. Thus,
𝛿𝑖 = 𝑊 when the i-th argument place of 𝑅 is singular, and 𝛿𝑖 = 𝑃 when the i-th
argument place is plural.
Definition 7.2: A valuation is a function ~⋅ assigning denotations to names and
predicates. This is done in the following way:
~𝑐 ∈ @
~𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝑝(@)
~𝑅 ⊆ 𝛿1 × ⋯ × 𝛿𝑛 when 𝑅 is a non-logical predicate
Definition 7.3: An immutabilist model ℳ𝐼 = ⟨𝑊, @, 𝐷, 𝑃 , ~⋅𝐼⟩ is a frame
together with a valuation function for the names and predicates in ℒ𝐼.
Definition 7.4: Afictionalistmodelℳ𝐹 = ⟨𝑊, @, 𝐷, 𝑃 , ~⋅𝐹⟩ is a frame together
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with a valuation function for the names and predicates in ℒ𝐹.
Definition 7.5: Let ℳ𝐼 be an immutabilist model. When 𝑤 ⊧𝜎 𝜙, we say that 𝜙 is
true at world 𝑤 relative to variable assignment 𝜎. This relation is defined recursively:
𝑤 ⊧𝜎 𝑅(𝑡1, … , 𝑡𝑛) iff ⟨𝜎(𝑡1), … , 𝜎(𝑡𝑛)⟩ ∈ ~𝑅 ∩ 𝛿𝑤1 × ⋯ × 𝛿𝑤𝑛
𝑤 ⊧𝜎 𝑡1 ≺ 𝑡2 iff 𝜎(𝑡1) ∈ 𝜎(𝑡2)
𝑤 ⊧𝜎 𝑡1 =𝑠 𝑡2 iff 𝜎(𝑡1) = 𝜎(𝑡2)
𝑤 ⊧𝜎 𝑡1 =𝑝 𝑡2 iff 𝜎(𝑡1) = 𝜎(𝑡2)
𝑤 ⊧𝜎 𝑡1 ∼ 𝑡2 iff 𝜎(𝑡1) ∈ 𝑤 iff 𝜎(𝑡2) ∈ 𝑤 for all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊
𝑤 ⊧𝜎 ¬𝜙 iff 𝑤 ̸⊧𝜎 𝜙
𝑤 ⊧𝜎 𝜙 ∧ 𝜓 iff 𝑤 ⊧𝜎 𝜙 and 𝑤 ⊧𝜎 𝜓
𝑤 ⊧𝜎 ∀𝑥𝜙 iff 𝑤 ⊧𝜎∗ 𝜙 for all 𝜎∗ such that 𝜎∗(𝑥) ∈ 𝑤
𝑤 ⊧𝜎 ∀𝑥𝑥𝜙 iff 𝑤 ⊧𝜎∗ 𝜙 for all 𝜎∗ such that 𝜎∗(𝑥𝑥) ∈ 𝑝(𝑤)
𝑤 ⊧𝜎 2𝜙 iff 𝑣 ⊧𝜎 𝜙 for all 𝑣 ∈ 𝑊
A sentence 𝜙 is true in ℳ𝐼 when true at all worlds relative to all variables assignments.
When it is, we write ℳ𝐼 ⊧ 𝜙.
Definition 7.6: Let ℳ𝐹 be a fictionalist model. When ⊧𝜎 𝜙, we say that 𝜙 is true
relative to variable assignment 𝜎. This relation is defined recursively:
⊧𝜎 𝑅(𝑡1, … , 𝑡𝑛) iff ⟨𝜎(𝑡1), … , 𝜎(𝑡𝑛)⟩ ∈ ~𝑅
⊧𝜎 𝑡1 ≺ 𝑡2 iff 𝜎(𝑡1) ∈ 𝜎(𝑡2)
⊧𝜎 𝑡1 =𝑠 𝑡2 iff 𝜎(𝑡1) = 𝜎(𝑡2)
⊧𝜎 𝑡1 =𝑝 𝑡2 iff 𝜎(𝑡1) = 𝜎(𝑡2)
⊧𝜎 𝑡1 ∼ 𝑡2 iff 𝜎(𝑡1) ∈ 𝑤 iff 𝜎(𝑡2) ∈ 𝑤 for all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊
⊧𝜎 ¬𝜙 iff 𝑤 ̸⊧𝜎 𝜙
⊧𝜎 𝜙 ∧ 𝜓 iff 𝑤 ⊧𝜎 𝜙 and 𝑤 ⊧𝜎 𝜓
⊧𝜎 ∀𝑥𝜙 iff 𝑤 ⊧𝜎∗ 𝜙 for all 𝜎∗
⊧𝜎 ∀𝑥𝑥𝜙 iff 𝑤 ⊧𝜎∗ 𝜙 for all 𝜎∗
⊧𝜎 Act(𝑡) iff 𝜎(𝑡) ∈ @
A sentence 𝜙 is true in ℳ𝐹 when true relative to all variable assignments. When it is,
we write ℳ𝐹 ⊧ 𝜙.
Definition 7.7: Amodel ℳ is regular if for every basic non-logical predicate:
⟨𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛⟩ ∈ ~𝑅 only if there is some 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 such that ⟨𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛⟩ ∈
𝛿𝑤1 × ⋯ × 𝛿𝑤𝑛 .
Somewhat more intuitively, a model is regular when individuals stand in non-
logical relations only when they exist together in some worlds. The above formulation
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generalizes this basic thought to include pluralities.
Definition 7.8: A frame is a compossiblewhen for every𝑤, 𝑣 ∈ 𝑊, there is a 𝑢 ∈ 𝑊
such that 𝑤 ∪ 𝑣 ∈ 𝑢.
Definition 7.9: A frame is a separable when for every 𝑆 ⊂ 𝑊, if ∪(𝑆) ∈ 𝑃, then
∪(𝑆) ∈ 𝑊.
As you would expect, when a model is based on a compossible frame, we will say
that the model is compossible and, when a model is based on a separable frame, we will
say that the model is separable.
Observation 7.10: Every compossible model is regular.
Definition 7.11: A model is a standard when it is compossible and separable and
makes every instance of Plural Comprehension true.
We can now characterize the three systems from the main text. CI consists of those
sentences of ℒ𝐼 that are true in all standard models. I consists of those sentence of ℒ𝐼
that are true in all regular models. Finally, F consists of those sentences of ℒ𝐹 that are
true in all regular models.
What we want to show now is that the languages ℒ𝐼 and ℒ𝐹 are structurally
equivalent, modulo the use of I and F as the relevant background logics.
We will say that an ℒ𝐼 language and ℒ𝐹 language correspondwhen they have the
same names and non-logical predicates. Given any two such languages, two models
ℳ𝐼 and ℳ𝐹 correspond when the valuation functions assign the same names and
the same predicates the same denotations.
Theorem 7.12: Let ℒ𝐼 and ℒ𝐹 be corresponding languages. There is then a recursive
translation 𝑔 from the sentences of ℒ𝐼 to the sentences of ℒ𝐹 such that ℳ𝐼 ⊧ 𝜙 iff ℳ𝐹 ⊧
𝑓(𝜙) whenever ℳ𝐼 and ℳ𝐹 are corresponding models.
Proof. We will first divide the plural variables of ℒ𝐼 into two infinite stocks 𝑥𝑥𝑖 and
𝑦𝑦𝑖. Now take any sentence 𝜙. We can suppose that none of the variables in the second
stock appear in𝜙. For if they do, we rewrite𝜙 as𝜙∗ using relettering, where𝜙∗ does not
include any such variables. We then translate 𝜙 using a family 𝑔𝑖 of recursive function
as follows:
𝑔[𝜙] = 𝑔0[𝜙]
𝑔𝑛[𝑅(𝑡1, … , 𝑡𝑛)] = 𝑅(𝑡1, … , 𝑡𝑛)
𝑔𝑛[¬𝜙] = ¬𝑔𝑛[𝜙]
𝑔𝑛[𝜙 ∧ 𝜓] = 𝑔𝑛[𝜙] ∧ 𝑔𝑛[𝜓]
𝑔𝑛[∀𝑥𝜙] = ∀𝑥(𝑥 ≺ 𝑦𝑦𝑛 ⊃ 𝜙)
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𝑔𝑛[∀𝑥𝑥𝜙] = ∀𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥 ≺ 𝑦𝑦𝑛 ⊃ 𝜙)
𝑔𝑛[2(𝜙)] = ∀𝑦𝑦𝑛+1(World(𝑦𝑦𝑛+1) ⊃ 𝑔𝑛+1[𝜙])
This gives us our translation. We could then easily verify, by induction on complexity,
that ℳ𝐼 ⊧ 𝜙 iff ℳ𝐹 ⊧ 𝑓(𝜙) whenever 𝑀𝐼 and 𝑀𝐹 are corresponding models. 
Theorem 7.13: Let ℒ𝐹 and ℒ𝐼 be corresponding languages. There is then a recursive
translation 𝑓 from the sentences of ℒ𝐹 to the sentences of ℒ𝐼 such that ℳ𝐹 ⊧ 𝜙 iff ℳ𝐼 ⊧
𝑔(𝜙) whenever ℳ𝐹 and ℳ𝐼 are corresponding models.
Proof. We start by dividing the plural variables of ℒ𝐹 into an infinite stock 𝑥𝑥𝑖 and a
single 𝑦𝑦. Now take any sentence 𝜙 of ℒ𝐹. We can suppose that the plural variable 𝑦𝑦
appears nowhere in 𝜙. Because if it did, we could use relettering to derive a logically
equivalent 𝜙∗, and then use that for our translation. We then recursively translate 𝜙 as
follows:
𝑓[𝜙] = ∃𝑦𝑦(𝑓∗[𝜙])
𝑓∗[𝑅(𝑡1, … , 𝑡𝑛)] = 𝑅(𝑡1, … , 𝑡𝑛)
𝑓∗[¬𝜙] = ¬𝑓∗[𝜙]
𝑓∗[𝜙 ∧ 𝜓] = 𝑓∗[𝜙] ∧ 𝑓∗[𝜓]
𝑓∗[∀𝑥𝜙] = 2(∀𝑥𝜙)
𝑓∗[∀𝑥𝑥𝜙] = 2(∀𝑥𝑥𝜙)
𝑓∗[Act(𝑡)] = 𝑡 ≺ 𝑦𝑦
As before, it remains to be shown thatℳ𝐹 ⊧ 𝜙 iffℳ𝐼 ⊧ 𝑔(𝜙)wheneverℳ𝐹 andℳ𝐼
are corresponding models. But once we have the translation scheme, this can easily be
shown by induction. 
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